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Was Arthur Andersen Different? 
An Empirical Examination of 
Major Accounting Firm Audits 
of Large Clients
Theodore Eisenberg and Jonathan R. Macey*
Enron and other corporate financial scandals focused attention on
the accounting industry in general and on Arthur Andersen in par-
ticular. Part of the policy response to Enron, the criminal prosecu-
tion of Andersen eliminated one of the few major audit firms
capable of auditing many large public corporations. This article
explores whether Andersen’s performance, as measured by fre-
quency of financial restatements, measurably differed from that of
other large auditors. Financial restatements trigger significant neg-
ative market reactions and their frequency can be viewed as a
measure of accounting performance. We analyze the financial
restatement activity of approximately 1,000 large public firms from
1997 through 2001. After controlling for client size, region, time,
and industry, we find no evidence that Andersen’s performance sig-
nificantly differed from that of other large accounting firms.
This article is about accounting firm performance and its implications for
the state of product differentiation and corporate governance in the
accounting industry. We investigate whether a serious sign of accounting
error, the substantive restatement of earnings by large publicly held com-
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panies, which are discovered by the issuer, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, or third parties, occurs with similar frequency across the major
accounting firms, or whether restatements tend to be isolated in particular
miscreant firms, particularly the late Arthur Andersen (Andersen).
Some of the governmental responses and initiatives to the wave of
Enron-style corporate collapses reflect the view that Andersen, Enron’s
auditor, was an outlier among accounting firms. Other government actions,
however, reflect the view that the major accounting firms are more or less
the same. For example, Andersen’s internal corporate governance, moni-
toring, and control systems may have been weak relative to those of the other
large accounting firms, and this lack of internal controls may have made
Andersen particularly vulnerable to “capture” by unscrupulous clients. Alter-
natively, it may be the case that all large accounting firms are similar in the
sense that all are equally susceptible to internal corporate governance prob-
lems, and all have, more or less, the same quality of internal controls. If so,
then all firms should be equally susceptible to the possibility that client firms
will capture the teams of auditors assigned to prepare financial statements
and cause these accountants to acquiesce in inappropriately aggressive
accounting treatment, or even to pro-actively participate in the design of
materially misleading accounting statements.
The stakes of accurately describing Andersen’s performance are high.
Remarkably few large accounting firms audit many large public corpora-
tions. Removing a major firm from such a thin market has implications for
the public securities markets as well as for the accounting industry. Inde-
pendent of Andersen’s particular performance, the stakes of understanding
the pattern of financial restatements are also high. Restatements have been
shown to trigger substantial drops in restating firms’ market value. Examin-
ing restatements, which reflect on the quality of a major product of account-
ing firms—their public company audits—may also foster insights about the
relation between large companies and their auditors and about the internal
governance of auditors.
Analysis of about 1,000 large public firms from 1997–2001 yields no
evidence that accounting profession problems that lead to restatements were
unique to Andersen. Andersen’s clients did not restate their financial results
at a significantly different rate than the other major accounting firms during
this period. During the period of our study, private plaintiffs and govern-
ment regulators began to focus more intensively on accounting irregulari-
ties and the percentage of public companies restating their financial results
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increased dramatically. Interestingly, however, we do not find a significant
rise in Andersen’s share of the increased number of restatements. Rather,
the distribution of restatements among the largest accounting firms
remained roughly the same.
Thus, by the restatement-rate measure, the vilified and now-defunct
Andersen was not objectively different from the other major accounting
firms. If financial restatement rates are a key measure of audit firm per-
formance, or if other measures of performance yield similar results, one may
question the government’s decision to end Andersen’s existence by bring-
ing criminal charges against it. Our findings also call into question the value
of market competition in generating successful product differentiation. Our
results do suggest that the accounting reforms implemented by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which apply to all accounting firms, can be defended on
the ground that accounting profession problems are industrywide and not
linked to any particular firm.
To the extent that financial restatement rates capture an important
component of accounting firm quality, we find little evidence that the top
accounting firms compete with one another on the basis of quality.
Part I of this article discusses the law and economics of accounting and
provides the relevant background to our analysis. Part II describes the data
and reports the empirical results. Part III discusses the results. A conclusion
follows.
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTING
A. The Paradigm
The law and economics literature has a simple and elegant explanation for
the importance of independent accounting firms.1 Generating information
about financial results is important for internal as well as external reasons.
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Debra C. Jeter, The Effects of Qualified Audit Opinions on Earnings Response Coefficients, 
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Management needs to know how the firm is performing, and therefore
needs accurate, reliable information on financial performance. However, all
the information management needs can be (and is) generated by firms inter-
nally. Demand for the services of independent outsiders to audit this infor-
mation exists because firms need a credible signal that they can send 
to outside investors that the financial results being reported are, in fact, 
accurate.
Thus, outside auditors do not perform any services for a company that
the company does not already perform for itself. The role of the auditor is
not to prepare financial reports for clients (that is the role of the account-
ant). Rather, the auditor’s role is to provide a reliable verification of the
company’s financial reports.
Thus, auditors’ reputations are central to the standard economic
theory of auditing. Only auditors with reputations for honesty and integrity
are valuable to audit-clients. The idea is that, absent a reputation for honesty
and integrity, the auditor’s verification function loses its value. In theory,
then, auditors invest heavily in creating and maintaining their reputations
for performing honest, high-quality audits. High-quality audits by inde-
pendent auditors who have good reputations are assured. The quality assur-
ance is derived from the fact that performing poor-quality audits diminishes
the value of the audit firm’s investment in reputation.2
The pre-Enron law and economics view of the accounting industry pre-
dicted that accounting firms compete in a “race-to-the-top” that provides
them with incentives to strive to produce high-quality audits.
There was a time that the audit function  was carried out in a market envi-
ronment that induced high quality financial reporting. In that era, accounting
firms were willing to put their seal of approval on the financial records of a client
company only if the company agreed to conform to the high standards imposed
by the accounting profession. Investors trusted accountants because investors
knew that any accounting firm that was sloppy or corrupt could not stay in busi-
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Reputation on Auditor Objectivity, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 49 (Sept. 
2001); Norman Macintosh, Teri Shearer, Daniel B. Thornton & Michael A. Welker, Financial
Accounting as Simulacrum and Hyperreality: Perspectives on Income and Capital, Accounting,
Organizations and Society 13 (Jan. 2000); Ronald R. King, Reputation Formation 
for Reliable Reporting: An Experimental Investigation, 71 Acct. Rev. 375 (1996); Watts & 
Zimmerman, supra note 1; Antle, supra note 1; George Benston, The Value of the SEC’s
Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 Acct. Rev. 515 (1969).
ness for long. Auditors had significant incentives to “do superior work” because
“auditors with strong reputations could command a fee premium, and high fees
signaled quality in the auditing market.”3
High-quality audit services were further assured by the audit firms’
independence from their clients, where independence is measured by the
percentage of an audit firm’s billings that are derived from a particular
client.4 In a world in which auditors have both invested in developing high-
quality reputations and in which no single client represents more than a tiny
fraction of total billings, high audit quality seems assured. Under these con-
ditions, any potential gain to an auditor from performing a shoddy audit,
much less from participating in a client’s fraud, would be vastly outweighed
by the diminution in value to the auditor’s reputation.
In sum, even though companies can (and do) audit themselves, they
can justify the expense of hiring outside auditors to enhance their financial
reputation and credibility with a wide range of current and prospective
claimants on their cash flows, including investors, suppliers, customers, and
prospective employees. Under this reputational model, companies need
independent audits to attract outside capital because it is widely believed
that an auditing firm that discovers a problem would insist on a correction
or, ultimately, fire the client. Being fired by an accounting firm has serious
implications for the client.5 The accounting firm that dismissed the audit-
client, however, would lose only that client, and even this loss could proba-
bly be offset as the accounting firm might well gain new clients by virtue of
the enhancement of its reputation that followed from firing the client.
So, even though companies can and do impose their own financial con-
trols and audit themselves, they hire outside auditors to capitalize on the
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4For example, Andersen was said to be independent of Enron because Andersen had 2,300
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for Enron. Id. at 1168.
5See, e.g., Martin Fackler, How Auditors Got the Nerve to Defy Big Japanese Bank, Wall St. J.
Aug. 6, 2003, at A1 (describing how auditors’ failure to sign off on financial projections of a
large Japanese bank caused a crisis that forced the bank to seek a $17 billion government bailout
that put the financial institution under government control).
audit firm’s reputation. Hiring an auditor, at least in theory, allows the client
company to “rent” the reputation of the accounting firm, which rents its 
reputation for care, honesty, and integrity to its clients. This, in a nutshell,
is the economic theory of the demand for the services of independent 
auditors.
In theory, then, accounting firms are willing to put their seal of
approval on a company’s financial records only if the company agrees to
conform to the high standards imposed by the accounting profession.
Investors trust accountants because investors know that any accounting firm
that is sloppy or corrupt could not stay in business for long. The long-term
loss to the reputation of an independent accounting firm that does slipshod
or fraudulent work is much greater than any possible short-term gains the
accounting firm might get by cutting corners. Companies that refuse to
comply with the auditors’ demands for transparency and simplicity in report-
ing risk being dismissed by their auditors. Being fired by an accounting firm
sends a negative signal to investors that often both devastates a company and
leads to the dismissal of top management. Outside audits send a strong signal
to investors that the company’s financial house is in order.
From the perspective of audit firms’ clients, good audits are good
investments because they reduce the cost of capital and increase shareholder
wealth. Good audits also increase management’s credibility among the
investment community. In theory, the capital markets audit the auditors.
Public accountants knew they had a lot to lose if their clients’ information
turned out to be false or misleading. Auditors who did a superior job would
reduce the chance of their clients’ issuing unreliable information and so reduce
their own risk of being sued by aggrieved investors. Such suits are costly to audi-
tors; even unsuccessful suits damage their valuable reputations.6
B. What Went Wrong?
It is generally thought that something went very wrong in the accounting
profession. Several factors may have contributed to a decline in audit quality.
The shift of organizational form from the general partnership form to the
limited liability partnership form reduced the threat of liability faced by
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mission to the Senate (Canada) Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Study
on the State of Domestic and International Financial System (May 29, 2002).
audit firm partners not directly involved in auditing a particular client. This,
in turn, may have resulted in a diminution in the incentives of accounting
firm partners to monitor the performance of their colleagues. The removal
of aider and abettor liability risk also may have, at the margin, reduced audi-
tors’ incentives to monitor one another,7 a reduction in incentives that was
exacerbated in 1995 by passage of the Public Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA).8
These changes may have been exacerbated by the increasing com-
plexity involved in performing audits. Auditing became more complex as
new and more sophisticated methods of financing proliferated and as the
audit rules themselves became more technical and complex. As a conse-
quence, audit firms that were engaged by large public companies found that
the “audit engagement teams” they assigned to perform audits had to spend
increasingly large percentages of their time performing audit services for
that client. Thus, for example, the head of Andersen’s Enron audit team
spent 100 percent of his time on the Enron account.9 This, in turn, led to
the capture of auditors by their clients, since auditors’ careers increasingly
came to depend entirely on the “care and feeding” of single clients. Thus,
just as the danger of client “capture” of auditors was increasing, the incen-
tives of accounting firms to develop internal corporate governance struc-
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7Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that
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The PSLRA established new rules of pleading that require plaintiffs’ complaints to “state with
particularity all facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind” when making a misstatement or omission in financial reporting. The PSLRA also
delayed the beginning of discovery until after a court has decided whether to allow the case to
go forward on the basis of the heightened pleading standards. Prior to passage of the PSLRA,
plaintiffs’ attorneys could begin to gather documents and interview witnesses as soon as their
complaint was filed. The PSLRA also sharply limited the doctrine of “joint and several liabil-
ity,” which ensures that victims can recover full damages even if one or more of the parties to
the fraud cannot pay. Under the PSLRA, those whose reckless misconduct contributes to the
fraud can be held responsible for only their proportionate share of victims’ losses. As a result,
when the primary perpetrator of the fraud is bankrupt, investors cannot fully recover their
losses from other entities, such as accounting firms.
9Macey & Sale, supra note 3.
tures to combat capture may have been decreasing due to the passage of
statutes providing limited liability to accounting firm partners.
The danger of client capture appears to have been further exacerbated
by the growth in the provision of highly profitable consulting services by
auditors. If the consulting services accounting firms offer to their audit-
clients have higher profit margins than the auditing services, accounting
firms will be tempted to use auditing work either as a loss leader or as a
mechanism for “ ‘opening the door’ with a client for the purpose of pitch-
ing their (higher margin) consulting services.”10 Providing consulting ser-
vices further erodes auditor independence by shifting the balance of power
away from the auditor and in the direction of the audit-client when auditors
are discussing audit work and retention issues. Worse, consulting services
provide a means by which audit-clients can reward auditors for succumbing
to the client’s wishes about what accounting treatment should be used to
report novel or complex transactions and business practices.11
Where auditors offer clients only audit services, the client’s only option
is to fire the auditor if the client does not think that the auditor is being suf-
ficiently aggressive. But when the accountants also are peddling consulting
services, the client can employ a “carrot and stick” strategy that rewards the
accounting firm for being compliant and punishes the firm for being inflex-
ible. This pressure is particularly acute in an environment in which the firm
is the only client of the engagement partner from the accounting firm that
is performing the audit, since a partner’s inability to procure lucrative con-
sulting work would be reflected in the salary, promotion, and bonuses of the
partner.
As John Coffee has observed, it is difficult for an audit-client to fire its
auditor because such dismissals invite “potential public embarrassment,
public disclosure of the reason for the auditor’s dismissal or resignation, and
potential SEC intervention.”12 By contrast, where a company is both an audit-
client and a consulting client of a particular accounting firm, “the client can
easily terminate the auditor as a consultant or reduce its use of the firm’s
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1411–12 (2002).
consulting services, in retaliation for the auditor’s intransigence.”13 When
the client terminates the high-margin consulting services provided by the
accounting firm and retains only the low-margin auditing services, there is
no need to make any public disclosure. This means that there is no risk that
firing the auditor from a consulting engagement will provoke heightened
scrutiny from investors, the SEC, or plaintiffs’ class action law firms.
Another major complaint about accounting firms has been about 
the quality of their internal corporate governance. The inability or unwill-
ingness of officials in Andersen’s head office in Chicago to monitor and
control the auditors in the field has been highlighted in the securities 
class action litigation that has followed in the wake of Enron. Carl Bass, 
an Andersen partner and member of that firm’s Professional Standards
Group, was apparently removed from the Andersen Professional Standards
Group when he tried to correct accounting errors in Enron’s financial
reporting. It also appears that accounting partners at Andersen were able
“to ignore with impunity the advice provided by higher level, more objec-
tive experts within the firm” and that these higher-level officials were unwill-
ing or unable to assert their authority by following through to ensure that
their recommendations were followed.14 It appears that the Enron-Andersen
relation really was an example of an accounting firm captured by its 
audit-client.
A number of surviving Arthur Andersen documents reveal that Arthur 
Andersen was concerned about, yet covered up or ignored fraudulent account-
ing practices by Enron. For instance, Arthur Andersen Professional Standards
Group (“PSG”) partner Carl Bass sent an e-mail on 12/19/99 to Defendants
Steward and Neuhausen expressing opposition to Enron’s accounting for [a
special purpose entity (SPE) funded with Enron equity called “LJM2” with whom
Enron had a contractual relationship] and urged Arthur Andersen not to
support it. Again on 2/4/00 Bass sent another e-mail to Stewart stating that Bass
thought that a particular SPE had no real substance and that he was annoyed
that Enron would receive appreciation on the Enron stock that had been con-
tributed to that SPE. That information was also sent to [other members of the
Enron audit team]. . . . Bass had . . . commented that “this whole deal looks like
there is no substance.” Later, on March 4, 2001, just before Bass was removed
as PSG advisor for the Enron audit team, Bass sent Stewart another e-mail crit-
icizing Enron’s accounting for the Blockbuster and Raptor transactions, which,
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aggregated, constituted at least $150 million in improperly recognized income
or avoided losses at year-end 2000.15
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS
The lens through which we attempt to observe evidence of differing account-
ing firm performance is incidence of financial restatements. As the name
implies, restatements occur when it is discovered that a company has made
errors in its quarterly or annual financial reports, requiring that those
reports be redone with the financial results “restated.” In other words,
restatements occur when an accounting firm errs sufficiently in reporting
the financial results of a client company to warrant restating the results.
Accounting restatements provide an opportunity to measure accounting
firm performance because they indicate the incidence of major accounting
errors.
Empirical evidence suggests the importance of restatements in terms
of both frequency and financial impact. A well-known General Accounting
Office (GAO) study reported that a surprisingly large portion (10 percent)
of publicly traded companies restated their financial results due to financial
irregularities from 1997–2001.16 Thus the problem appears to extend
beyond the famous restatements that companies such as Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, Adelphia, and Global Crossing have been required to do.
Accounting restatements have, on average, a significant negative
impact on equity returns.17 An important study by Kinney and McDaniel on
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16U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Financial Statement Restatements, GAO-03-138 (July 2003).
17Messod D. Beneish, Detecting GAAP Violations: Implications for Assessing Earnings Man-
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(1997); Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of
Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13
Contemporary Acct. Res. 1 (1996); Mark L. DeFond & James Jiambalvo, Incidence and Cir-
cumstances of Accounting Errors, 66 Acct. Rev. 643 (1991); Ehsan H. Feroz, Kyungjoo Park &
Victor S. Pastena, The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases, 29 J. Acct. Res. (Supp.) 107 (1991); William R. Kinney, Jr. & Linda S.
McDaniel, Characteristics of Firms Correcting Previously Reported Quarterly Earnings, 11 
J. Acct. & Econ. 71 (1989); Zoe-Vanna Palmrose, Vernon J. Richardson & Susan W. Scholz,
the characteristics of restating firms found significant negative share price
reactions upon the issuance of restatements.18 Richardson et al. found that
firms that restate experience declines in share prices of 25 percent on
average.19 The GAO study, consistent with academics’ analyses, found that
restatements cost investors 10 percent of the equity value of their shares from
the day before to the day after the restatement. Measuring the 120-day
period beginning 60 days before the restatement to 60 days after the restate-
ment, the GAO found that restatement cost investors 18 percent of their
stock value. Firms issuing restatements also tend to be less profitable, slower
growing, more heavily leveraged, and have received more qualified audit
opinions.20
Moreover, it appears that many financial restatements mask precisely
the information that investors value most: information about downturns in
economic performance. Callen, Livnat, and Segal found, for example, that
companies that restated their performance due to accounting errors “exhib-
ited poorer financial performance during the period affected by the
restatement relative to the prior period.”21
Of course, restatements are not the only indicia of auditing errors or
of the possibility of auditor capture. Another way that auditors can be lax is
by allowing clients to treat accounting errors that should trigger restate-
ments as prospective changes of estimates of future performance, and allow-
ing the changes in accounting treatment to flow through current and future
periods in order to avoid attracting attention. Other indicia of auditor
quality are the rate at which auditors issue qualifications of their opinions,
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Accounting Restatements, 2001 Ohio State Univ. Working Paper.
18Kinney & McDaniel, supra note 17. This study, interestingly, also found significant abnormal
returns between the issuance of erroneous quarterly reports and the correction of those reports
via restatement. Whether these returns are attributable to insider trading or some other mech-
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19Scott A. Richardson, A. Irem Tuna & Min Wu, Predicting Earnings Management: The Case
of Earnings Restatements (unpublished paper) (Oct. 2002).
20Kinney & McDaniel, supra note 17, at 71–93.
21Jeffrey Callen, Joshua Livnat & Dan Segal, Accounting Restatements: Are They Always Bad
News? 1 (May 2002), available at <http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/accounting/papers/a2002-
07.pdf>.
and the rate at which firms switch auditors. None of these other approaches
to the issue we address lends itself to the empirical approach we take in this
article because these other indicia require much more subjective judgments
about the motivation for the changes being made.
Restatements are, on average, clearly bad for investors, but the precise
economic cost of restatements is difficult to quantify because of the inchoate
nature of certain of the costs associated with the restatement process.
Accounting restatements lead to a reduction in trust in the accounting
results reported by public companies. As trust in financial reporting
declines, investors are likely to flee the capital markets, making capital for-
mation more difficult and leading, ultimately, to higher capital costs, slower
growth, and higher unemployment.
A. The Data
We use two data sets to study financial restatement rates.
First, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified firms that
restated their financial results from 1997–2001. The GAO data are especially
appropriate because they discriminate by the nature of the financial restate-
ment. Not all restatements are the same. Although accounting literature 
traditionally treats all restatements as potentially bad signals for investors 
and other financial statement users, more recent studies show that some
restatements are less problematic than others. A 2002 study by Callen, Livnat,
and Segal found that about 15 percent of restatements due to accounting
errors, and about 40 percent of restatements due to changes in accounting
principles, actually increase the income of the firms that are making the
restatements.22
Consistent with these observations about restatements, the GAO
restatements database we use excludes restatement announcements that
resulted from expectedly positive events, normal corporate activity, or simple
presentation issues. The database excludes financial statement restatements
resulting from mergers and acquisitions, discontinued operations, stock
splits, issuance of stock dividends, currency-related issues, changes in busi-
ness segment definitions, changes due to transfers of management, changes
made for presentation purposes, litigation settlements, and arithmetic and
general book-keeping errors. Also excluded from the GAO sample are
274 Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients
22Callen et al., supra note 21.
general accounting changes made under generally accepted accounting
principles, and changes resulting from accounting policy changes. Thus,
only restatements made to correct a previous misstatement of financial
reports are in the GAO data.23
Second, to identify the universe of possible restatements of large firms,
we rely on published data from annual editions of Who Audits America.24
These data are needed because the GAO data reveal which firms restate but
do not reveal which firms do not restate. The Who Audits America annual
reports contain information about each publicly traded firm, including sales,
location of headquarters, Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code based
on the 1987 U.S. SIC classification, and, most importantly, which account-
ing firm audited each firm. Our focus is on large firms, so we limit the
sample to firms with $1 billion or more in sales as measured in 2001 dollars.
B. Hypotheses to be Tested
Using the GAO and other data, empirical analysis of financial restatements
may shed light on the issues of Andersen’s performance relative to other
firms and of auditor independence and governance.
First, if Andersen systematically delivered lower-quality audits, one
would expect the rate of financial restatements to be higher among 
Andersen’s clients. Whether revealed by SEC scrutiny or market forces, in-
accurate financial statements are difficult to cover up forever. Either a com-
pany improves earnings sufficiently to cover the inaccuracy or the inaccuracy
is eventually reflected in earnings discontinuity or outright scandal.
Second, Part I’s discussion of audit firm capture suggests that large
companies will be better able to capture their accounting firms than smaller
companies. Other things being equal, the existence of a financial restate-
ment should be associated with increasing firm size but prior research results
on this point are mixed. Kinney and McDaniel find that firms that are forced
to correct their financial results typically are smaller than other firms in their
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U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Public Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation and 
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respective industries.25 But other research reveals that attempts by company
management to make accounting adjustments that create the appearance of
improved corporate performance tend to be more successful for larger firms
than for smaller firms. Both Nelson et al. and Wright and Wright have found
that auditors are more likely to succumb to managers’ attempts to manage
earnings for large clients than for small clients.26
The GAO found that about 10 percent of all listed companies
announced at least one restatement during the period 1997 to June 2002.
But it reports that restatements were traditionally seen as primarily affecting
small companies and technology companies.27 The decreasing rate of restate-
ments as firms increase in size may constitute evidence undermining the
capture hypothesis. Alternatively, the firms in the full GAO sample, while
large, may be, on average, still too small to capture auditors. Further explor-
ing the relation between firm size and restatement rates among large firms
should provide support for one explanation or the other. It may be that firms
have to reach a very significant size level before capture becomes likely. Since
our data include a plausible measure of firm size—sales—this hypothesis can
be tested.
C. Empirical Results
1. Restatement Rates by Audit Firms
We first examine factors that might influence restatement rates in isolation
and then combine the influence of these factors in regression models.
Table 1 reports the basic relation between accounting firms and
restatement rates. For each major auditing firm, the first row of numbers is
the proportion of large-firm clients that had financial restatements. For
example, Table 1’s first row shows, under the 1997 column, that no large
firms audited by Andersen in 1997 have, according to the GAO, restated
their results. The same row, under the table’s 2001 column, shows that 3.1
percent of Andersen’s 2001 larger clients issued financial restatements. The
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26Mark W. Nelson, John A. Elliott & Robin L. Tarpley, Evidence from Auditors about Managers’
and Auditors’ Earnings Management Decisions, 77 Acct. Rev. 175 (2002) (Supp.); Arnie Wright
& Sally Wright, An Examination of Factors Affecting the Decision to Waive Audit Adjustments,
12 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 15 (1997).
27GAO-03-138, supra note 16 at 17.
numbers in the rows appearing under the restatement rates indicate the total
number of firms in the sample audited in the year. For example, the 1997
column indicates that the zero restatements for Andersen clients in that year
were out of 202 clients. The 3.1 percent Andersen restatement rate for 2001
is based on a total Andersen client sample for 2001 of 224. The number of
restatements would thus be 0.031 ¥ 224, or seven restatements.
Table 1’s “Total” column reports the cumulative five-year restatement
rates and client counts for each firm. Of the five major accounting firms that
span our five-year sample period (Coopers merged into PWC and thus
appears in only one column), Andersen had the lowest rate of restatements,
1.6 percent. The year-by-year analyses contained in the table’s individual
columns indicate that this low rate over our five-year sample period is not
an artifact of one peculiar year. In no year was Andersen the leader in restate-
ment rates for large firms. In fact, no firm differed statistically significantly
from other firms in restatement rates. Andersen’s low rate could be a con-
sequence of random fluctuation, but no evidence supports it having a higher
restatement rate than other accounting firms.
The small number of restatements raises the question of whether the
data have sufficient power to detect an Andersen effect, even if one exists.
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Table 1: Audit Firm Restatement Rates for Large Clients, by Year,
1997–2001
Year
Audit Firm 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Andersen 0.000 0.010 0.021 0.014 0.031 0.016
202 199 285 212 224 1,122
Coopers 0.008 — — — — 0.008
132 — — — — 132
Deloitte 0.000 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.049 0.018
165 152 233 167 164 881
Ernst 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.005 0.034 0.021
215 215 291 218 233 1,172
KPMG 0.000 0.007 0.024 0.034 0.034 0.020
147 144 208 146 149 794
PWC 0.000 0.015 0.013 0.037 0.048 0.024
145 270 371 272 269 1,327
Total 0.005 0.012 0.022 0.020 0.039 0.020
1,006 980 1,388 1,015 1,039 5,428
NOTE: The first row for each firm is the number of restatements divided by the number of
audits. The second row for each firm is the number of audits.
SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.
A power computation helps assess this issue. The non-Andersen restatement
rate is 90 restatements out of 5,306 audits or 0.017. Suppose one designated
a restatement rate of twice the industry standard to be socially meaningful.
Under this view, an Andersen restatement rate of 0.034 would be socially
important. Given our sample size, the probability of detecting a difference
in restatement rates this large or larger, at a 0.05 level of statistical signifi-
cance, is 0.89, close to 90 percent. If, instead, one regarded a restatement
rate of 1.5 the industry average as important, the probability of detecting
such a difference, at the 0.05 level, in our sample is 39 percent. So the per-
suasiveness of our finding of no statistically significant difference between
Andersen and other firms depends on how large a difference one would
regard as socially important. Putting aside the power calculation, the inabil-
ity to detect a significant effect in five full years of large-firm data suggests
that the effect requires many years of data to emerge. This is in contrast to
other factors we analyze, notably firm size and the trend of increasing
restatements over time, that do emerge in the same size sample. So the
absence of an Andersen effect is likely not merely a consequence of sample
size.
However, other factors should be considered. Even within this set of
restatements, as filtered by the GAO, not all restatements are the same.
Restatements due to errors in “revenue recognition” (recording revenues)
is the largest category of restatements due to accounting errors. It has the
largest negative effect on firms, accounting for an average decline in ROA
(return on assets) of eight percent.28 To further examine the restatement
pattern across accounting firms, we isolate those firms that were forced to
restate their financial results due to earnings restatements. For each firm,
we divided the number of revenue recognition restatements by the number
of restatements. Table 2 reports the results.
The table reveals no statistically significant pattern of revenue recog-
nition restatements (p = 0.469) across accounting firms. Andersen’s rate is
not the lowest, but it is far from the highest. Aside from Coopers, which has
only one year of data, Andersen had the second lowest rate of revenue recog-
nition restatements.
Clients and auditors may differ in their willingness to acknowledge pre-
vious accounting errors by issuing financial restatements. For example, as
noted above, an auditor can be lax by allowing clients to treat corrections
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that should cause restatements as prospective changes of estimates, which
flow through current and future periods, and avoid attracting attention.
Thus, the fact that accounting firms have similar restatement rates may not
reflect actual audit quality or auditor independence because some auditors
may be more reluctant to issue restatements or may have a pool of clients
that are more reluctant. To the extent that an accounting firm values its rep-
utation, the firm may be reluctant to require that an audit-client restate its
financial results, since such a requirement will reflect poorly on the audit
firm’s original work. Thus accounting firms may have an incentive to refrain
from revealing their previous errors in the hopes that such errors will remain
undetected.
This sort of unrevealed behavior is obviously difficult to detect but two
tests of this hypothesis can be conducted with available information. First,
the GAO data provide one useful approach. The GAO report includes an
analysis of the identity of the source that initially prompted the restatement.
SEC-prompted restatements may be of special concern because neither the
company nor its auditor has been forthcoming. Auditor-prompted restate-
ments may be of interest because they represent tension between auditors
and management.29 Another way in which auditor reluctance to issue restate-
ments might emerge is through observing the restatement pattern in the year
after audit-clients switch auditors. If Andersen were an outlier, one might
expect to see a higher rate of restatements by its former clients in the year
following a change of auditors. To study these, we identified each instance
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standing that, as a matter of industry practice, auditors typically report auditing mistakes to
their clients and give the clients the opportunity to report the restatement.
Table 2: Rates of Revenue-Recognition Restatements by Auditing Firm
Audit Firm Proportion of Restatements Involving Revenue Recognition Number of Restatements
Andersen 0.278 18
Coopers 0.000 1
Deloitte 0.563 16
Ernst 0.360 25
KPMG 0.250 16
PWC 0.344 32
Total 0.352 108
SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.
of auditor change and recorded whether a restatement occurred in the year
following change. Table 3 summarizes the results of both inquiries.
Table 3, Panel A, reports the entity prompting restatement for each of
the 108 restatements in our data. It shows, as best the GAO can detect, that
no auditing firm is a fertile source of restatement initiatives. Only two of 108
restatements were prompted by the auditor and no auditor prompted more
than one restatement. The many unknown prompters, 47 of 108 (44
percent), suggests hesitation in reaching firm conclusions. Nevertheless, the
GAO data provide little evidence that Andersen is unusual. The SEC
prompted restatements in five of the 18 (28 percent) Andersen-client restate-
ments. KPMG’s six of 16 (38 percent) rate was higher and the rate of SEC-
prompted statements did not differ significantly across accounting firms 
(p = 0.583).
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Table 3: Audit-Firm Propensity to Suppress Needed Restatements
A. Entity Prompting Financial Restatement
Unknown SEC Auditor Company or Company/FASB Total Restatements
Andersen 10 5 0 3 18
Coopers 1 0 0 0 1
Deloitte 8 3 0 5 16
Ernst 8 7 1 9 25
KPMG 6 6 0 4 16
PWC 14 5 1 12 32
Total 47 26 2 33 108
B. Restatements in Year After Auditor Changes
Old Auditor No Restatement Restatement Percent Restatements Total Audits
Andersen 12 1 7.7 13
Deloitte 6 1 14.3 7
Ernst 12 0 0.0 12
KPMG 16 2 11.1 18
PWC 26 0 0.0 26
Total—year 72 4 5.3 76
following change
No change 4,998 100 2.0 5,098
Total 5,070 104 2.0 5,174
NOTE: Each cell in Panel A is the number of restatements prompted by the entity represented
in the column. Panel B’s firm-specific rows are the number of audits with and without restate-
ments in the year following a change of auditors. Panel B excludes Coopers because all of its
clients had to change auditors following its combination with what is now PWC.
SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.
Of those restatements with known causes, Andersen’s five of eight
restatements was high, but not statistically significantly different from even
the lowest rate, PWC’s five of 18 (p = 0.189). If one looks at SEC-prompted
restatements as a proportion of all audits (Table 1 reports the number of
audits by each firm), rather than of all restatements, the differences in
restatement rates by source of restatement become vanishing small.
Panel B reports the restatement rates for the year following a change
of auditor. We exclude Coopers because its absorption by PWC meant that
all of its clients had to change auditors. The restatement rate across all other
firms in the year following an audit change is about 5.3 percent. This rate
is 2.7 times the restatement rate in years in which there was no auditor
change, shown in Panel B’s penultimate row (p = 0.066). So auditor change
years seem to lead to a higher rate of restatements, but there again is little
evidence of an Andersen effect. The rate of audits for previous Andersen
clients in years following auditor change is 7.7 percent. Deloitte and KPMG
have higher rates; Ernst and PWC have lower rates. The small number of
auditor changes makes one hesitate to conclude too much, but yet another
piece of evidence fails to support Andersen as a performance outlier.
2. Other Influences on Restatement Rates
Size. As audit-clients increase in size, the risk of audit-firm capture should
increase. As suggested above, the person who heads the audit team of a large
client likely finds his or her career path increasingly tied to pleasing that
client as the client increases in size. This suggests that we should expect an
increasing rate of restatements as firm size increases. Figure 1 shows pre-
cisely this effect. The restatement rate for audit-clients with sales in excess
of about $14 billion is more than twice the restatement rate for audit clients
with sales of about $1 billion.
The existence of the size effect raises the question of whether the effect
varies by audit firm. Would a figure such as Figure 1 vary if it were broken
down by the major auditing firms? The Appendix shows the relation between
restatement rates and client size for individual audit-firm figures. It suggests
that the relation between client size and restatements is strongest for Deloitte
and PWC, and not strong at all for Andersen.30
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all of an audit firm’s clients’ sales. The results do not materially differ from those reported in
the Appendix.
Regional Effects. Accounting-firm capture might manifest itself in the form
of regional or local office effects. Treating each firm as a single entity does
not reflect the reality of how dispersed their offices are. Although Andersen
generally may have been no different than the other big accounting firms,
perhaps Andersen’s offices in particular parts of the country were more sus-
ceptible to capture.
The small number of large-client restatements, 108 over a five-year
period, limits the ability to detect effects at the local office level. Table 4
reports the restatement rates for each audit firm for each region. For
example, it shows that Andersen’s New England offices restated 1.4 percent
of audits. Andersen offices in the west restated 2.7 percent of audits.
Andersen does show some interoffice variation. The restatement rate
in the plains states (defined in this study to comprise Kansas, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota) is higher than in other regions.
However, two factors suggest that this is not evidence of an Andersen effect.
First, the plains states restatement rates were highest for all the remaining
Big 4 firms. And the difference between the plains states restatement rate
and that for other regions is smaller for Andersen than for the other firms.
Second, the plains region has by far the smallest number of audits, 95 out
of 5,245 and the data become too thin to support positive conclusions. For
282 Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients
Figure 1: Restatement rate by audit-client size.
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SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America, 1997–2001.
example, Andersen’s 3.4 percent plains region restatement rate is one
restatement out of 29. A test of whether one can reject the hypothesis that
Andersen’s restatement rates were equal across regions yields a p-value of
0.58, using Fisher’s exact test, suggesting that the hypothesis cannot be
rejected. Only KPMG’s intra-firm variation across regions is statistically sig-
nificant, with p = 0.04.
Table 4’s last column ignores individual accounting firm variation but
reveals a possible overall regional effect. The plains states had by far the
highest rate of restatements, 7.4 percent compared to a national average 
of 2.1 percent. Although this regional variation does not appear to be 
particularly revealing of something special about Andersen, it does suggest
that a complete analysis of restatement rates should account for regional
effects.
Industry effects. Certain industries may be more difficult to audit than others
because the nature of their business is more complex. Alternatively, it may
be that the participants in some industries are more unscrupulous than
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Table 4: Financial Restatement Rates by Audit Firm and Region
Audit Firm
Region Andersen Coopers Deloitte Ernst KPMG PWC Total
New England 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.047 0.035 0.026
71 19 44 84 86 113 417
Mid-Atlantic 0.012 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.034 0.020
168 37 178 238 169 353 1.143
South (confederacy) 0.025 0.000 0.020 0.013 0.016 0.028 0.020
324 28 204 309 193 211 1,269
Midwest 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.031 0.014 0.031 0.020
321 25 204 326 139 228 1,243
Plains 0.034 0.000 0.045 0.100 0.111 0.250 0.074
29 2 22 20 18 4 95
Pacific/south-west 0.017 0.091 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.019
118 11 193 138 120 143 723
South (nonconfed) 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
50 3 24 35 44 75 231
West 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.016
37 6 11 19 8 43 124
Total 0.016 0.008 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.027 0.021
1,118 131 880 1,169 777 1,170 5,245
NOTE: The first row for each region reports the restatement rate for the audit firm in the
region. The second row for each region reports the number of audits for the audit firm in the
region.
SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.
others, or that they are subject to more intense competitive pressures that
induce them either to cheat more or to take more aggressive accounting
positions in order to impress customers, suppliers, or participants in the
capital markets that extend credit to the company. These factors suggest that
one ought to control for possible industry effects before concluding that
audit firms do or do not differ in restatement rates.
The distribution of clients among large audit firms highlights the need
to account for industry effects. The degree of client-industry concentration
within the accounting profession has become acutely worse since Andersen
disappeared. Table 5 reports the GAO’s findings on the percentage of assets
audited by particular accounting firms in selected industries.31 For example,
among general building contractors, two firms (Andersen and Ernst &
Young) audited 64.5 percent of the industry assets in 1997, while two firms
(Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche) audited 80.1 percent of the indus-
try assets in 2002. Similarly, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers and Andersen audited
61.7 percent of the assets in the petroleum and coal products business in
1997, while Pricewaterhouse-Coopers audited 76.4 percent of this industry
in 2002. Since audit firms’ client concentrations vary by industry, it is useful
to control for clients’ industries in assessing audit-firm effects.
The GAO used the industry categories reported in Table 5 to illustrate
industry concentration. But the 28 industries in Table 5 account for only
about half the observations in our data. In addition, the GAO industry cat-
egories yield eight categories of firms that did not issue restatements.32 This
lack of variation precludes including such industry categories in the regres-
sion models below. We therefore use the Standard Industrial Classifications
(SIC) used by the GAO33 but regroup the classifications into 17 reasonably
sized categories, each with some number of restatements. Table 6 reports
the restatement results by our industry groupings.
Industry restatement rates vary from 5.2 percent in “Instruments and
related products” to 0.7 percent in “Mineral industries.” One can reject the
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31The data in these tables are from GAO Mandated Report, supra note 24, at 27–30 & Appen-
dix I.
32These eight categories are Metal mining, Lumber and wood products, Furniture and fixtures,
Fabricated metal products, Trucking and warehousing, Air transportation, Nondepository insti-
tutions, and Security and commodity brokers.
33The GAO used the SIC codes reported in Who Audits America. GAO Mandated Report, supra
note 24, at 111.
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Table 5: Percent of Assets of Selected Industries Audited by Particular
Accounting Firms 1997, 2002
Ernst &
Andersen Coopers Deloitte Young KPMG PWC
1997 1997 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
General building 31.6 17.7 13.3 19.4 32.9 60.7 3.3 3.3 0.6 15.0
contractors
Petroleum and 33.2 11.1 1.0 3.2 21.9 18.2 4.3 2.2 28.5 76.4
coal products
Air 39.9 0.0 1.4 37.4 37.5 48.7 20.8 13.4 0.3 0.4
transportation
Nondepository 8.9 0.9 8.3 28.4 3.6 3.8 72.8 59.5 2.8 3.8
institutions
Metal mining 31.0 16.8 0.4 0.6 9.1 40.6 3.9 6.4 37.6 50.1
Chemical and 20.6 16.0 21.0 25.1 14.6 14.1 11.7 10.6 15.0 48.7
allied products
Industry 5.7 4.6 5.4 6.3 5.7 11.4 45.5 51.9 32.6 29.5
machinery and
equipment
Business services 8.8 51.6 12.8 11.2 15.4 6.3 6.3 8.7 4.3 60.8
Oil and gas 15.9 13.8 5.1 5.3 17.2 12.1 2.6 18.3 45.1 63.4
extraction
Furniture and 49.1 1.5 9.4 11.1 7.5 13.2 7.0 6.1 22.2 68.4
fixtures
Transportation 1.4 38.4 46.3 44.0 6.9 8.8 1.1 1.6 5.9 45.4
and
equipment
Electric, gas, and 35.8 17.7 28.0 62.2 2.9 5.8 3.3 7.3 11.9 24.2
sanitary
services
Security and 0.0 20.9 30.3 56.8 46.8 37.3 1.3 3.0 0.6 2.7
commodity
brokers
Health services 10.2 9.2 5.3 5.0 45.0 44.1 24.2 29.8 4.4 18.5
Depository 6.6 6.5 8.3 11.2 21.6 15.8 31.6 35.6 19.7 35.2
institutions
Lumber and 82.5 2.7 9.0 8.7 0.5 42.5 0.7 29.1 3.8 18.4
wood products
Printing and 32.5 9.0 13.5 21.5 21.7 25.1 7.5 13.9 14.0 37.5
publishing
Water 34.7 1.9 10.6 9.8 16.7 20.1 11.6 9.9 34.7 60.1
transportation
Holding, other 35.4 3.7 4.5 26.8 14.6 26.8 31.0 19.4 3.8 15.4
investment
companies
Primary metals 9.2 28.2 5.4 11.7 25.7 26.8 0.3 1.2 30.8 59.3
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Table 5: Continued
Ernst &
Andersen Coopers Deloitte Young KPMG PWC
1997 1997 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
Paper and allied 35.5 11.8 15.0 44.2 13.4 24.3 9.0 12.8 14.5 18.6
products
Trucking and 46.7 4.3 4.5 29.5 27.1 16.2 15.3 49.6 1.5 1.9
warehousing
Communications 24.6 30.8 6.1 61.0 18.8 5.7 5.9 7.2 13.5 23.8
Hotels and other 88.6 0.3 1.7 29.7 2.4 41.7 6.0 12.8 0.0 14.4
lodging
Fabricated metal 16.4 14.6 4.3 12.9 12.4 25.2 23.4 24.5 27.1 36.0
products
SOURCE: GAO Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition.
Table 6: Restatement Rates by Industry
Nonrestatements Restatements
SIC-Based Groups Number Percent Number Percent Total Audits
Mineral industries 145 99.3 1 0.7 146
Construction industries 74 97.4 2 2.6 76
Manufacturing 589 98.2 11 1.8 600
Transportation and utilities 591 98.7 8 1.3 599
Communications 150 98.7 2 1.3 152
Wholesale trade 262 97.0 8 3.0 270
Retail trade 482 97.6 12 2.4 494
Finance, insurance, and real estate 752 99.2 6 0.8 758
Services 462 98.3 8 1.7 470
Instruments and related products 109 94.8 6 5.2 115
Food and kindred products 172 96.6 6 3.4 178
Paper and allied products 107 97.3 3 2.7 110
Chemicals and allied products 228 97.9 5 2.2 233
Industrial machinery and equipment 308 96.9 10 3.1 318
Electrical and electronic equipment 212 95.9 9 4.1 221
Transportation equipment 160 96.4 6 3.6 166
No SIC listed or SIC missing 517 99.0 5 1.0 522
Total 5,320 98.0 108 2.0 5,428
Pearson chi2(16) = 31.1675; p = 0.013.
SOURCE: GAO Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition.
hypothesis that the industry groups have the same restatement rate at the
0.013 level. It thus is appropriate to control for industry effects in assessing
audit firm restatement rates.
Time Trend. Figure 2 shows by year the proportion of financial statements
that were restated. It shows an obvious upward trend. Restatement rates by
large firms rose from less than 1 percent in 1997 to nearly 4 percent in 2001.
The number of restatements increased eight-fold, from five in 1997 to 41 in
2001. These findings are consistent with studies showing that the number of
restatements generally has been on the rise for several years.34
The increase in restatements is important for a number of reasons.
First, from the perspective of this article, an increase in the number of
restatements provides an opportunity for accounting firms to distinguish
themselves on the basis of quality if they so choose. This is because if the
general level of errors in financial reporting is rising, then an individual
accounting firm can differentiate its product simply by keeping its own rate
of accounting errors constant. The marked increase in restatements shown
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Figure 2: Financial statement restatement rate by year.
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SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America, 1997–2001.
in Figure 2 indicates that an accounting firm could develop a reputation for
providing higher-quality audit services than its rivals simply by holding con-
stant the level at which its clients restate their earnings. Such a strategy would
generate product differentiation as rivals’ clients report increasingly high
levels of accounting problems. But this has not been the case. All the large
accounting firms’ clients continue to restate their financial results at similar
rates, even as the overall level of restatements continued to increase between
1997 and 2001.
Similarly, the time-trend data is of interest because it suggests 
that, whatever the source of the errors in accounting that lead to restate-
ments, the phenomenon appears to be getting more rather than less pro-
nounced. The restatement phenomenon precedes the Enron debacle and
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, and has continued after these events, sug-
gesting that the pathologies within the accounting profession and within cor-
porate management are not easily resolved by political salience or legislative
action.
The time trend likely reflects, among other factors, the efforts by the
SEC, which began in late 1998 and 1999 to focus energy and resources on
earnings management and aggressive accounting.35 We find it interesting
that this increased focus did not result in any differences in accounting irreg-
ularities among the clients of any single large accounting firm. All the big
accounting firms appear to have responded the same way not only to pres-
sure from management, but also to the SEC’s enhanced enforcement
agenda.
3. Regression Models
Taken in isolation, we find no audit-firm effect on restatement effects, a sig-
nificant plains states regional effect, suggestive industry effects, and a highly
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35The beginning of the SEC’s focus on accounting issues can be traced to a speech made on
Sept. 28, 1998 by then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt at the NYU Center for Law and Business,
which is said to have “launched the SEC’s attack on the practice of “earnings management” by
public companies.” Available at <http://www.bassberry.com/resources/corp/061199/2.html>;
see also CNNMoney, available at <http://money.cnn.com/1999/07/28/fortune/fortune_
earnings/>, reporting on “SEC crackdown on managed earnings,” and
<http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/sep2000/grant.htm> (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants website, quoting Arthur Levitt as saying, on Sept. 28, 1998, “We will formally target
reviews of public companies . . . that appear to manage earnings. Likewise our enforcement
team will continue to root out and aggressively act on abuses of the financial reporting
process.”) (cites accessed Oct. 15, 2003).
suggestive time trend. To more fully explore audit-firm effects, we consider
them simultaneously with the other factors in regression models. Because
the dependent variable in our models is dichotomous—each firm in each
year did or did not restate financial results—logistic regression is an appro-
priate model. Since we have multiple observations of most client firms (each
client firm reports financial results each year), it is appropriate to control
for the nonindependence of the client observations across years. We adjust
the standard errors of the regression coefficients to account for this non-
independence. Table 7 reports the results.36
Table 7 indicates that the absence of evidence of any audit-firm effects
survives controlling for industry, firm size, region, and year. The effects
reported in the univariate results persist. There are strong, significant time
effects and a plains states effect. The industry variables, not reported in the
table, are collectively significant, but this result is sensitive to how industries
are allocated among the major groupings. The noteworthy result is that our
finding of no evidence of differences in restatement rates across accounting
firms persists after controlling, as best we can, for the fact that accounting
firms appear to specialize along industry-specific lines, for regional effects,
for client size, and for time effects.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS
The restatement results have implications on two levels. First, of course, they
directly show whether Andersen’s audits yielded financial restatement rates
materially different from those of other firms. Second, the results, as proxies
for accounting firm performance, can help assess the state of client capture
and corporate governance in the studied firms.
A. Is Andersen an Outlier?
As noted earlier, some policy choices reflect the belief that Andersen was a
special case of bad behavior within the accounting industry. Others appear
to reflect the belief that accounting industry problems are endemic, that
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year-of-audit time, and dummy variables for audit firms also yield no significant audit-firm
effects. Maximum likelihood complementary log-log regression models similarly yield results
like those in Table 7.
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Models of Restatements
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable = Restatement (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Andersen (reference category)
Coopers -0.759 -0.787 0.695 0.626
(0.74) (0.76) (0.62) (0.55)
Deloitte 0.126 0.078 0.091 -0.011
(0.36) (0.23) (0.26) (0.03)
Ernst 0.290 0.277 0.291 0.155
(0.95) (0.90) (0.94) (0.49)
KPMG 0.232 0.229 0.250 0.161
(0.65) (0.64) (0.69) (0.45)
PWC 0.416 0.365 0.323 0.291
(1.41) (1.26) (1.10) (0.98)
Sales (log) 0.207* 0.204* 0.183+
(2.27) (2.27) (1.91)
Year 1997 (reference category)
Year 1998 0.966+ 0.974+
(1.67) (1.67)
Year 1999 1.563** 1.619**
(2.92) (3.00)
Year 2000 1.456** 1.466**
(2.66) (2.66)
Year 2001 2.169** 2.194**
(4.22) (4.22)
New England (reference category)
Mid-Atlantic -0.083
(0.22)
South confederacy -0.046
(0.12)
South nonconfederacy -1.688
(1.59)
Midwest -0.165
(0.43)
Plains 1.463**
(3.18)
West -0.279
(0.36)
Pacific/southwest -0.231
(0.54)
Industries by SIC code Not reported
Constant -4.116** -5.793** -7.251** -6.543**
(17.86) (7.23) (7.74) (5.99)
Observations 5,428 5,428 5,428 5,428
+Significant at 10 percent; *significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent.
NOTE: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.
Andersen was not unusual. Both sets of underlying assumptions could be
true. The accounting industry might need reform and, within the industry,
Andersen may have been an especially suspect participant. Under this view,
a policy analysis of whether to single out Andersen for termination through
criminal prosecution would include considering factors in addition to those
customarily informing the decision to criminally prosecute.
In general, the theory that Andersen was a “miscreant” and an outlier
seems to have been embraced by the Justice Department and by courts exam-
ining Andersen’s behavior. This outlier view appears in an opinion in the
civil class action securities fraud lawsuit against Enron’s professional advi-
sors, including Andersen as well as Enron’s banks and law firms. The opinion
in In re Enron Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation quotes the government’s
complaint to the effect that Andersen “is a repeat offender with a history of
failed audits, conflicts of interest and document destruction in some of the
most egregious cases of accounting fraud in history.” Specifically mentioned
are Andersen’s allegedly improper conduct in Waste Management, Sunbeam
Corporation, Baptist Foundation of Arizona, Colonial Realty Company, and
Lincoln Savings/ACC. Andersen, it seems, deserved to fail since the firm was
alleged to have had a “callous, reckless disregard for its duty to investors and
the public trust for decades.”37 The Justice Department’s decision to bring
criminal charges against Andersen and none of the other major accounting
firms supports the view that Andersen deserved to be singled out for special
treatment, though of course the decision to bring any prosecution depends
on other factors, including the strength of the case and, sometimes, the
public’s perceived demand for action.
The evidence presented here cannot of course directly counter 
the court’s qualitative statements, which are consistent with the Justice
Department’s behavior, about Andersen’s behavior. The evidence does
suggest that, by one objective measure of accounting performance, 
Andersen was a mainstream firm.
Consistent with our results, on January 2, 2002, Deloitte & Touche pub-
lished the results of its audit quality peer review of Andersen. This peer
review is considered “one of the most intensive peer reviews in Andersen’s
history,” covering 240 Andersen audit engagements in 30 offices (the sample
did not include Enron), and concluded that “Andersen’s system of account-
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ing and audit quality provided reasonable assurance of compliance with pro-
fessional standards.”38
In related research, Chaney and Philipich have examined whether
Andersen’s performance in its Enron engagement affected the share prices
of Andersen’s other clients.39 As with our research, Chaney and Philipich try
to determine whether auditor reputation matters, and the extent to which
market forces are effective at inducing managers to submit to high-quality
monitoring in order to reduce agency costs.
Chaney and Philipich examine the market reaction to Enron-related
events that might have an impact on Andersen’s reputation for providing
high-quality audits. Chaney and Philipich find that Andersen clients begin
losing value, relative to companies audited by other accounting firms, in
January 2001. Unlike our own research, Chaney and Philipich’s research
appears to assume that Andersen’s reputation was not different from that of
the other Big 5 accounting firms prior to the Enron debacle. Interestingly,
and consistent with our results, in their event studies, Chaney and Philipich
do not find any statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns for
Andersen clients and non-Andersen clients as a result of Enron’s announce-
ment on November 8, 2001 that it was restating its financial results; nor do
they find any negative abnormal returns when Andersen was subpoenaed by
Congress to turn over documents related to Enron. There also was no
finding that Andersen’s clients performed worse than the clients of other
audit firms around December 12, 2001, when Andersen’s CEO, Joseph
Bernardino, testified before Congress that Andersen’s Enron audit engage-
ment team had made errors in judgment in connection with its auditing
work for Enron.40
Interestingly, however, Chaney and Philipich do find statistically sig-
nificant negative results for Andersen’s clients surrounding the January 10,
2002 date when Andersen announced that it had shredded audit documents
related to its work on the Enron account. These results might be interpreted
as evidence of a loss of reputation for Andersen, relative to other firms. On
the other hand, rather than signaling relative quality, these results also could
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Acct. Res. 1221, 1223 (2002) (quoting Deloitte & Touch report).
39Id.
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be interpreted as signaling that Andersen was likely to be indicted as a result
of its document shredding and that the probability of the firm surviving was
low. It is also worth noting that document shredding does not reflect on the
firm’s overall ability to conduct audits.
Chaney and Philipich’s results might be interpreted more straightfor-
wardly as signaling the market’s assessment of the probability of Andersen’s
survival. The prospect that Andersen would fail posed significant regulatory
costs and uncertainty on its existing clients. In addition to the direct costs
of having to switch auditors if Andersen should fail, public companies
audited by Andersen faced the risk that they would be unable to file in a
timely fashion legally mandated reports with the SEC that require the inclu-
sion of audit-related services and opinion letters. Thus, even holding auditor
quality constant, the prospect that Andersen would cease to exist as a going
concern would be expected to have a significant negative effect on the share
prices of Andersen’s clients.
In addition, during the period studied by Chaney and Philipich, there
also was uncertainty about whether certain institutional investors would be
able to invest in companies audited by Andersen. This result appears to be
confirmed by Rauterkus and Song’s finding that the unsealing of the crim-
inal indictment against Arthur Andersen had a negative and significant
impact on Andersen’s clients, while no other event besides Enron’s bank-
ruptcy filing had a statistically significant effect on Andersen’s clients.41
An important additional factor that should have influenced the deci-
sion to effectively close Andersen is the accounting industry’s high concen-
tration. The top four firms account for more than 60 percent of the entire
market. The Big 4 firms audit over 97 percent of public companies with sales
over $250 million. They audit 99 percent of public company total sales. The
smallest Big 4 accounting firm had $3.2 billion in revenue in 2002. The fifth
largest firm, Grant Thornton, had only $400 million in revenue, and 
the sixth largest firm, BDO Seidman, had $353 million in revenue.42 After
Andersen’s demise, the Hirschman-Herfendahl index (HHI) for the
accounting profession increased to 2566, well above the threshold of 1800
that indicates a highly concentrated market in which firms have the poten-
tial for market power.
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The market for auditing the work of large companies is even more con-
centrated. In 2002, the four-firm concentration ratio for public companies
was 99 percent.43 In 1997, when Andersen was still in business, the concen-
tration ratio was only 71 percent. Thus, unless Andersen was truly an outlier,
effectively terminating its existence was an important public policy question
that may not have been given full consideration. As the GAO observed in its
report, “It is unclear whether and to what extent the Antitrust Division was
consulted and to what extent the DOJ’s Antitrust Division had input into the
decision to criminally indict Andersen.”44
By contrast, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress’s legislative
response to the Enron era, reflects the premise that significant structural
problems in the accounting industry required legislative attention. For
example, Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB),45 which was given the authority to oversee accounting firms
that audit public companies. The Act requires accounting firms that perform
audits of public companies to register with the PCAOB. The PCAOB is
empowered to set standards for the reports generated in the course of public
company audits, to inspect public accounting firms, to conduct investiga-
tions, and to impose sanctions on accounting industry professionals and
accounting firms that fail to meet PCAOB standards.
Sarbanes-Oxley also provides sanctions for accounting firms that fail to
supervise their accountants, and establishes duties of care for audit firms
and their partners.46 To improve auditor independence, Sarbanes-Oxley
requires that the auditor partners assigned to client accounts be rotated
every five years47 and severely restricts consulting and other nonaudit ser-
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a given number of the largest firms in the industry. The two most common concentration ratios
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such, is the proportion of total output produced by the four largest firms in the industry and
the eight-firm concentration ratio is the proportion of total output produced by the eight
largest firms in the industry. The four-firm concentration ratio is commonly used to indicate
the degree to which an industry is oligopolistic. Id. at 136–37.
44Id. at 19.
45Pub. L. No. 107-204, codified in various parts of Titles 15 and 18 of the U.S. Code, §§ 101–109.
46Id. § 105.
47Id. § 203.
vices that audit firms can offer their clients.48 These restrictions were
designed to improve auditor independence by preventing the preparation
of accounting statements by accounting firms from being used as a “loss
leader” for the purpose of selling more lucrative tax and consulting services.
Our empirical results are consistent with the premise, inherent in 
Sarbanes-Oxley, that problems that exist in the accounting industry were 
not isolated in a single firm, but are shared by all the firms that audit 
public companies.
B. Client Capture and Corporate Governance
The evidence on accounting firm restatements does not indicate that the
other accounting firms have been captured to any greater or lesser degree
than Andersen. It does, however, suggest one notable relation between firm
size and restatement likelihood.
The positive, significant coefficient on firm size in Table 7, as mea-
sured by sales, may be interpreted as evidence of capture. The coefficient
indicates that larger firms are more likely to restate their financial results
than the smaller firms in our sample. But recall that all the firms analyzed
here are large in the sense that they have sales of at least $1 billion. This
result is consistent with the capture theory of accounting firms. It is not con-
sistent, however, with the GAO’s findings that smaller firms are more likely
to restate. The difference in result may be explained by the fact that we
analyze only large firms’ restatements, while the GAO examined all public
firms that issued restatements.
The GAO found that, as a general matter, small firms are more likely
to restate than are large firms. By contrast, among our sample of larger firms,
the largest firms are more likely to restate than are the rest of our sample.
It could also be that the ability of client corporations to use promises to give,
or threats to withhold, consulting work to achieve bargaining leverage over
consulting firms has led to an increase in audit-firm capture by smaller firms.
We think that it is more likely that consulting firm revenue bears some rela-
tionship to the size of the company receiving such services. If this is true,
then large firms would have been more likely to capture their auditors than
would smaller firms.
Research in accounting that has found a correlation between firm size
and management attempts to manage earnings has been explained on the
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basis that large clients simply have more sophisticated accounting depart-
ments that are better at financial engineering that presents financial results
in ways that are consistent with applicable accounting principles. However,
since we are looking at restatements, which reflect accounting errors, and
not the results of generic disagreements between auditors and their clients,
our findings are not vulnerable to this explanation. Instead, the capture
hypothesis seems more consistent with our data set.49
C. Accounting Firm Reputation
Our analysis also helps assess whether the large accounting firms differenti-
ate themselves on the basis of performance. Product differentiation is, in
theory, important to firms. Even firms that enjoy monopolistic or oligopo-
listic competitive environments benefit by producing high-quality products
because they can charge more for such products. Of course, not all firms
seek to distinguish themselves from direct rivals and close substitutes by
offering superior-quality products: some compete by offering low-quality
products that cost less, and still other firms compete in less scrupulous
ways.50
Writing about “Enron-style” scandals, for example, Karpoff and Lott
argue that the financial value of a law-abiding reputation is better than
tougher government regulation in preventing scandals.51 Karpoff and Lott
believe that firms’ desire to protect their reputations makes it unnecessary
for Congress to pass tougher accounting regulations and reforms. Indeed,
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49See Nelson et al., supra note 26; Wright & Wright, supra note 26.
50In highly regulated industries, demand for firms’ services may be created artificially. For
example, companies could once compete for investors by seeking the assistance of auditors and
publicizing that assistance. With enactment of the federal securities laws, companies were
required to have auditors to fulfill regulatory requirements. These sorts of regulations have the
capacity to distort the competition that occurs among auditors.
51Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Commit-
ting Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757 (1993). A press release on the University of 
Washington website indicates that Karpoff and Lott have updated their results after Enron. This
press release describes the accounting industry as having incentives to develop reputations for
performing high-quality work, “accounting firms will develop stronger reputations for provid-
ing honest results to their clients . . . [T]heir reputations will cost more to clients, but some
firms will find it worthwhile to pay more because they want to convince investors that their
books are not cooked.” See <http://www.washington.edu/newsroom/news/2002archive/02-
02archive/k022802a.html> (accessed Aug. 8, 2003).
Karpoff and Lott find that increases in criminal penalties for financial fraud
may do more harm than good because they tend to squeeze out reputation
as a means for reducing the incidence of fraud. Their study presumes that
accounting firms can and will differentiate themselves by developing
stronger reputations for providing honest results to their clients.
The evidence regarding accounting firm restatement rates implies
that, by this measure, one cannot meaningfully distinguish among the largest
(Big 5 or Final 4) accounting firms on the basis of the quality of their work.
Major accounting firms make an insignificantly different number of errors,
as evidenced by restatements. This, in turn, removes one important way in
which accounting firms might have distinguished themselves in terms of
their reputations. Consistent with this intuition, data from other studies
yields no evidence that any of the Big 4 accounting firms is able to charge
a “quality premium” over other Big 4 firms for their services. An extensive
literature search also turned up no evidence that any Big 4 firm enjoys a
higher reputation among consumers than the others. Thus, the evidence
that we have seen does not support Karpoff and Lott’s conclusions. Although
the Big 4 accounting firms may have the incentives to distinguish themselves
from their rivals that Karpoff and Lott identify, they do not appear to have
succeeded in achieving product differentiation in one important area.
A recent GAO study complements our findings regarding the reputa-
tions of the Big 4 accounting firms. The study shows that factors such as
expertise, global reach, and reputation do not play a role in determining
the market shares of accounting firms. Rather, a simple model of pure price
competition that does not take these factors into consideration is able to
simulate the actual market shares of the Big 4 accounting firms that we
observe.52 In this model, clients choose auditors using price, ignoring factors
such as quality or reputation, to assess whether the current high degree of
concentration in the market for audit services is necessarily inconsistent with
a price-competitive setting.53 These results are consistent with our findings
that audit firms have not succeeded in differentiating their products from
those of their competitors. Rather, the results produced by the computer-
generated market model “mimicked a process of pure price competition in
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which firms bid for each client, based on the short-term cost of performing
the audit.”54 This result held on simulations in which firms competed for
clients from scratch, as well as in simulations in which companies were
assigned to their current auditors in order to determine if firms could
defend their current market shares based solely on price competition. The
model also simulated a situation in which the five largest firms below the
Big 4 were combined in order to see if they could compete successfully with
the Big 4 for large clients. Interestingly, the model predicted that the new
firm that resulted from the merger of the fifth through the ninth largest
audit firms would not make significant inroads into the market share of the
current Big 4 audit firms.
Our findings are consistent with these results, but they are not consis-
tent with the GAO’s 2003 survey of chairpersons of Fortune 500 companies’
audit committees. Ninety-one percent of respondents found that the repu-
tation of the audit firm was important (58 percent of respondents found that
the reputation of the audit firm was of “very great importance” and 33
percent found that the audit firm’s reputation was of “great importance”).55
Interestingly, none of the survey respondents felt that the reputation of the
audit firm was of little or no importance: indeed only 9 percent thought that
auditor reputation was only moderately important.
Of course it may well be that accounting firms do not compete on the
basis of the measure of quality captured here, but instead along some other
vector. A recent study of stock options granted to top executives of 224 firms
that announced financial restatements due to accounting irregularities
during the period January 1997 through June 2002 found that firms that
announced large negative restatements had granted about 50 percent more
stock options to their top executives in the years prior to the restatement
announcement.56 This study found that firms in the top 20 percent of option
grants have twice as many restatements as firms in the bottom 20 percent of
firms by option grants. The implication of this study is that private gains in
the option portfolios of top managers may have given them incentives to
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Management? Evidence from Accounting Restatements, March 2003 Harvard Business School
working paper.
interpret GAAP aggressively. These executives, in turn, could use their sig-
nificant leverage over their firms’ choice of accounting firms to select an
auditor that will comply with management’s preference for aggressive/illegal
accounting. This would, in turn, lead accounting firms who are unwilling to
succumb to managers’ preferences for aggressive accounting treatment to
lose business to more aggressive rivals. However, our results do not indicate
that this “race-to-the-bottom” theory of competition and product differenti-
ation in the accounting industry is any more robust than the “race-to-the-
top” theory described above.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our analysis suggests that the nation’s largest accounting firms, which audit
virtually all U.S. publicly held companies, have not distinguished themselves
from their competitors by the quality of audit services, as measured by
restatement rates. It may well be that investment in product differentiation
to achieve performance above current levels would entail costs in excess of
expected benefits.
In any case, we find that managers of large public companies who want
to distinguish themselves from their competitors by choosing a tough, high-
quality auditor cannot do so. As measured by financial restatement rates, no
such auditor is available: one cannot reject the hypothesis that they all are
the same.
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APPENDIX—FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT RATES BY YEAR
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NOTE: The figure’s components use client sales percentiles computed from all audit firms’
clients. The percentile breakpoints on the x-axes therefore are the same across all firms.
SOURCES: GAO; annual editions of Who Audits America.
